Defenses against adversarial examples, such as adversarial training, are typically tailored to a single perturbation type (e.g., small ℓ∞-noise). For other perturbations, these defenses offer no guarantees and, at times, even increase the model's vulnerability. Our aim is to understand the reasons underlying this robustness trade-off, and to train models that are simultaneously robust to multiple perturbation types.
Introduction
Adversarial examples [33, 13] are proving to be an inherent blind-spot in machine learning (ML) models. Adversarial examples highlight the tendency of ML models to learn superficial and brittle data statistics [17, 11] , and present a security risk for models deployed in cyber-physical systems (e.g., virtual assistants [5] , malware detectors [14] or ad-blockers [34] ).
Known successful defenses are tailored to a specific perturbation type (e.g., a small ℓ p -ball [22, 25, 37] or small spatial transforms [9] ). These defenses provide empirical (or certifiable) robustness guarantees for one perturbation type, but typically offer no guarantees against other attacks [31, 28] . Worse, increasing robustness to one perturbation type has sometimes been found to increase vulnerability to others [9, 28] . This leads us to the central problem considered in this paper:
Can we achieve adversarial robustness to different types of perturbations simultaneously?
Note that even though prior work has attained robustness to different perturbation types [22, 28, 9] , these results may not compose. For instance, an ensemble of two classifiers-each of which is robust to a single type of perturbation-may be robust to neither perturbation. Our aim is to study the extent to which it is possible to learn models that are simultaneously robust to multiple types of perturbation.
To gain intuition about this problem's hardness, we first study a simple and natural classification task, that has been used to analyze trade-offs between standard and adversarial accuracy [36] , and the sample-complexity of adversarial generalization [27] . We define Mutually Exclusive Perturbations (MEPs) as pairs of perturbation types for which robustness to one type inherently implies vulnerability to the other. For this task, we prove that ℓ ∞ and ℓ 1 -perturbations are MEPs and that ℓ ∞ -perturbations and small image rotations and translations [9] are also MEPs. Moreover, for these MEP pairs, we find that fundamentally different features are needed to achieve robustness Accuracy Adv∞ Adv1 Adv2
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To complement our formal analysis, we introduce new adversarial training schemes for multiple perturbations. For each training point, these schemes build adversarial examples for all perturbation types and then train either on all examples (the "avg" strategy) or only the worst example (the "max" strategy). These two strategies respectively minimize the average error rate across perturbation types, or the error rate against an adversary that picks the worst perturbation type for each input.
For adversarial training to be practical, we also need efficient and strong attacks [22] . We show that Projected Gradient Descent [19, 22] is inefficient in the ℓ 1 -case, and design a new attack, Sparse ℓ 1 Descent, that is both efficient and competitive with strong optimization attacks [7] , We experiment with MNIST and CIFAR10. MNIST is an interesting case-study, as distinct models from prior work attain strong robustness to all perturbations we consider [28, 9] , yet no single classifier is robust to all attacks [28, 29] . For models trained on multiple ℓ p -attacks (ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 , ℓ ∞ for MNIST, and ℓ 1 , ℓ ∞ for CIFAR10), or on both ℓ ∞ and rotation-translation attacks [9] , we confirm a noticeable robustness trade-off. Figure 1 plots the test accuracy of models Adv max trained using our "max" strategy. In all cases, robustness to multiple perturbations comes at a cost-usually of 5-10% additional error-compared to training and evaluating models against each attack individually (the dotted horizontal lines). The robustness trade-off is often due to poor adversarial generalization [27] , i.e., the Adv max models get 100% training accuracy for all perturbations they are trained against.
Robustness to ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 and ℓ ∞ -noise on MNIST is a striking failure case, where a potential robustness trade-off is compounded by gradient-masking [24, 35, 1] . Extending prior observations [22, 28, 20] , we show that models trained against an ℓ ∞ -adversary learn an input-thresholding behavior that masks gradients for attacks in other ℓ p -norms. When trained against first-order ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 and ℓ ∞ -attacks, the model Adv max thus learns to resist ℓ ∞ -attacks while giving the illusion of robustness to ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 attacks. When evaluated on gradient-free attacks [3, 28] , the model only achieves 52% accuracy. This shows that, unlike previously thought [36] , adversarial training with strong first-order attacks can learn to optimize its training objective using gradient-masking. We thus argue that robustness to ℓ p -noise on MNIST will require different techniques than first-order adversarial training (e.g., training on more expensive gradient-free attacks, or scaling certified defenses to multiple perturbations).
MNIST has sometimes been said to be a poor dataset for evaluating adversarial examples defenses, as some attacks are easy to defend against (e.g., input-thresholding or binarization works well for ℓ ∞ -attacks [36, 28] ). Our results paint a more nuanced view: the simplicity of these ℓ ∞ -defenses becomes a disadvantage when training against multiple ℓ p -norms. We thus believe that MNIST should not be abandoned as a benchmark just yet. Our inability to achieve multi-ℓ p robustness for this simple dataset raises questions about the viability of scaling current defenses to more complex tasks.
Looking beyond adversaries that choose from a union of perturbation types, we introduce a new affine adversary that may linearly interpolate between perturbations (e.g., by compounding ℓ ∞ -noise with a small rotation). We prove that for locally-linear models, robustness to a union of ℓ p -perturbations implies robustness to affine attacks. In contrast, affine combinations of ℓ ∞ and spatial perturbations are provably stronger than either perturbation individually. We show that this discrepancy translates to neural networks trained on real data. Thus, in some cases, attaining robustness to a union of perturbation types remains insufficient against a more creative adversary that composes perturbations.
Our results show that despite recent successes in achieving robustness to single perturbation types, many obstacles remain towards attaining truly robust models. Beyond the robustness tradeoff, efficient computational scaling of current defenses to multiple perturbations remains an open problem.
Theoretical Limits to Multi-perturbation Robustness
We study statistical properties of adversarial robustness in a natural statistical model introduced in [36] , and which exhibits many phenomena observed on real data, such as trade-offs between robustness and accuracy [36] or a higher sample complexity for robust generalization [28] . This model also proves useful in analyzing and understanding adversarial robustness for multiple perturbations. Indeed, we prove a number of results that correspond to phenomena we observe on real data, in particular trade-offs in robustness to different ℓ p or rotation-translation attacks [9] . 1 We follow a line of works that study distributions for which adversarial examples exist unconditionally [36, 18, 30, 10, 12, 23] . These distributions, including ours, are much simpler than real-world data, and thus need not be evidence that adversarial examples are inevitable in practice. Rather, we hypothesize that current ML models are highly vulnerable to adversarial examples because they learn superficial data statistics [17, 11] that share some properties of these simple distributions.
Adversarial Risk for Multiple Perturbation Models
Consider a classification task for a distribution D over examples x ∈ [0, 1] d and labels
denote a classifier and let l(f (x), y) be the zero-one loss (i.e., ½ f (x) =y ).
We assume n perturbation types, each characterized by a set S of allowed perturbations for an input x. The set S can be an ℓ p -ball [33, 13] or capture other perceptually small transforms such as image rotations and translations [9] . For a perturbation r ∈ S, an adversarial example iŝ x = x + r (this is pixel-wise addition for ℓ p perturbations, but can be a more complex operation, e.g., for rotations).
For a perturbation set S and model f , we define R adv (f ; S) := E (x,y)∼D [max r∈S l(f (x + r), y)] as the adversarial error rate. To extend R adv to multiple perturbation sets S 1 , . . . , S n , we can consider the average error rate for each S i , denoted R avg adv . This metric most clearly captures the trade-off in robustness across independent perturbation types, but is not the most appropriate from a security perspective on adversarial examples. A more natural metric, denoted R max adv , is the error rate against an adversary that picks, for each input, the worst perturbation from the union of the S i . More formally,
Most results in this section are lower bounds on R avg adv , which also hold for R 
A binary classification task
We analyze the adversarial robustness trade-off for different perturbation types in a natural statistical model introduced by Tsipras et al. [36] . Their binary classification task consists of input-label pairs (x, y) sampled from a distribution D as follows (note that
where
is the normal distribution and η = α/ √ d for some positive constant α. For this distribution, Tsipras et al. [36] show a trade-off between standard and adversarial accuracy (for ℓ ∞ attacks), by drawing a distinction between the "robust" feature x 0 that small ℓ ∞ -noise cannot manipulate, and the "non-robust" features x 1 , . . . , x d that can be fully overridden by small ℓ ∞ -noise.
Small ℓ ∞ and ℓ 1 Perturbations are Mutually Exclusive
The starting point of our analysis is the observation that the robustness of a feature depends on the considered perturbation type. To illustrate, we recall two classifiers from [36] that operate on disjoint feature sets. The first, f (x) = sign(x 0 ), achieves accuracy p 0 for all ℓ ∞ -perturbations with ǫ < 1 but is highly vulnerable to ℓ 1 -perturbations of size ǫ ≥ 1. The second classifier,
, yet it is fully subverted by a ℓ ∞ -perturbation that shifts the features x 1 , . . . ,
We prove that this tension between ℓ ∞ and ℓ 1 robustness, and of the choice of "robust" features, is inherent for this task:
+1} be a binary classifier for D. Let S ∞ be the set of ℓ ∞ -bounded perturbations with ǫ = 2η, and S 1 the set of ℓ 1 -bounded perturbations with ǫ = 2. Then,
The proof is in Appendix F. The bound shows that no classifier can attain better R avg adv (and thus R max adv ) than a trivial constant classifier f (x) = 1, which satisfies R adv (f ; S ∞ ) = R adv (f ; S 1 ) = 1/2.
Small ℓ ∞ and Spatial Perturbations are (nearly) Mutually Exclusive
We now analyze two other orthogonal perturbation types, ℓ ∞ -noise and rotation-translations [9] . In some cases, increasing robustness to ℓ ∞ -noise has been shown to decrease robustness to rotationtranslations [9] . We prove that such a trade-off is inherent for our binary classification task.
To reason about rotation-translations, we assume that the features x i form a 2D grid. We also let x 0 be distributed as N (y, α −2 ), a technicality that does not qualitatively change our prior results. Note that the distribution of the features x 1 , . . . , x d is permutation-invariant. Thus, the only power of a rotation-translation adversary is to "move" feature x 0 . Without loss of generality, we identify a small rotation-translation of an input x with a permutation of its features that sends x 0 to one of N fixed positions (e.g., with translations of ±3px as in [9] , x 0 can be moved to N = 49 different positions). A model can be robust to these permutations by ignoring the N positions that feature x 0 can be moved to, and focusing on the remaining permutation-invariant features. Yet, this model is vulnerable to ℓ ∞ -noise, as it ignores x 0 . In turn, a model that relies on feature x 0 can be robust to ℓ ∞ -perturbations, but is vulnerable to a spatial perturbation that "hides" x 0 among other features. Formally, we show:
). Let S ∞ be the set of ℓ ∞ -bounded perturbations with ǫ = 2η, and S RT be the set of perturbations for an RT adversary with budget N . Then, R
The proof, given in Appendix G, is non-trivial and yields an asymptotic lower-bound on R avg adv . We can also provide tight numerical estimates for concrete parameter settings (see Appendix G.1).
Affine Combinations of Perturbations
Our definition of adversarial multi-perturbation robustness (i.e., the error rate R max adv ) assumes an adversary that chooses one type of perturbation for each input. If a model were robust to this adversary, what can we say about the robustness to a more creative adversary that combines different perturbation types? To answer this question, we introduce a natural adversary that mixes different attacks by means of affine transformations that "linearly interpolate" between perturbations.
For a perturbation set S and β ∈ [0, 1], we denote β · S the set of perturbations scaled down by β. For an ℓ p -ball with radius ǫ, this is the ball with radius β · ǫ. For rotation-translations, the attack budget N is scaled to β · N . For two sets S 1 , S 2 , we define S affine (S 1 , S 2 ) as the set of perturbations that compound a perturbation r 1 ∈ β · S 1 with a perturbation r 2 ∈ (1 − β) · S 2 , for any β ∈ [0, 1].
Consider one adversary that chooses, for each input, ℓ p or ℓ q -noise from balls S p and S q , for p, q > 0. The affine adversary picks perturbations from the set S affine defined as above. We show:
. Thus, for linear classifiers, robustness to a union of ℓ p -perturbations implies robustness to affine adversaries (this holds for any distribution). The proof, in Appendix H extends to models that are locally linear within balls S p and S q around the data points.
2 Our experiments in Section 4 show that neural networks trained on CIFAR10 have a behavior that is consistent with locally-linear models, in that they are as robust to affine adversaries as against a union of ℓ p -attacks.
In contrast to the ℓ p -case, we show that even for linear models, affine adversaries can gain by interpolating between ℓ ∞ and spatial perturbations:
). Let S ∞ be some ℓ ∞ -ball and S RT be rotation-translations with budget N > 2. Define S affine as above.
This result (the proof is in Appendix J) draws a distinction between the strength of affine combinations of ℓ p -noise, and combinations of ℓ ∞ and spatial perturbations. It also shows that robustness to a union of perturbations can be insufficient against a more creative affine adversary. These results are consistent with behavior we observe in models trained on real data (see Section 4).
Algorithm 1: The Sparse ℓ 1 Descent Attack. P q (|g|) denotes the q th percentile of |g| and Π S ǫ 1 is the projection onto the ℓ 1 -ball as described in [8] .
New Attacks and Adversarial Training Schemes
We complement our theoretical results with empirical evaluations of the robustness trade-off on MNIST and CIFAR10. To this end, we first introduce new adversarial training schemes tailored to the multi-perturbation risks defined in Equation (1), as well as a novel attack for the ℓ 1 -norm.
Adversarial training with multiple perturbation sets. Consider the empirical adversarial riskR
where L(f (x), y) is the cross-entropy loss and {(
is the training set. For a single perturbation type,R adv can be minimized with adversarial training [22] : the maximal loss is approximated by an attack procedure
, let A i be an attack for the perturbation set S i . The two multi-attack robustness metrics introduced in Equation (1) immediately yield the following natural adversarial training strategies: 1. "Max" strategy: For each input x, we train on the strongest adversarial example from all attacks, i.e., the max inR adv is replaced by
2. "Avg" strategy: This strategy simultaneously trains on adversarial examples from all attacks. That is, the max inR adv is replaced by
The sparse ℓ 1 descent attack. Adversarial training is contingent on a strong and efficient attack procedure. Training on weak attacks gives no robustness [35] , while strong optimization attacks (e.g., [6, 7] ) are prohibitively expensive. Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [19, 22] is a popular choice of attack that is both efficient and produces strong perturbations. To complement our formal results, we want to train models on ℓ 1 -perturbations. Yet, we show that the ℓ 1 -version of PGD is highly inefficient, and propose a better approach suitable for adversarial training. PGD is a steepest descent algorithm [21] . In each iteration, the perturbation r is updated in the steepest descent direction arg max v ≤1 v T g, where g is the gradient of the loss. For the ℓ ∞ -norm, the steepest descent direction is simply sign(g) [13, 19, 22] . In the ℓ 1 -case, the steepest descent direction is the unit vector e with e i * = sign(g i * ), for i * = arg max i |g i |. This yields an inefficient attack, as each iteration updates a single index of r. We thus design a new attack with finer control over the sparsity of the update steps. For q ∈ [0, 1], let P q (|g|) be the q th percentile of |g|. We then set e i = sign(g i ) if |g i | ≥ P q (|g|) and 0 otherwise, and normalize e to unit ℓ 1 -norm. For q ≫ 1/d, we thus update many indices of r at once. We introduce another optimization to handle clipping, by ignoring gradient components where the update step cannot make any progress (i.e., if x i + r i is on the boundary of the input domain and g i points outside the domain). To project r onto an ℓ 1 -ball, we use an algorithm of Duchi et al. [8] . Algorithm 1 describes our Sparse ℓ 1 Descent Attack. It vastly outperforms the steepest descent PGD attack (see Appendix B) and is competitive with the more expensive EAD attack [7] (see Appendix C).
Experiments
We use our new adversarial training schemes to measure the robustness trade-off on MNIST and CIFAR10. Despite its idiosyncrasies, MNIST is an interesting case-study as distinct models achieve strong (arguably too strong in some cases [16] ) robustness to different ℓ p -perturbations and spatial attacks [28, 9] . Despite the dataset's simplicity, we show that no single model achieves strong ℓ ∞ , ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 robustness, and that novel techniques may be required to close this gap.
Training and evaluation setup. We first use adversarial training to train models on a single perturbation type. For MNIST, we use ℓ 1 (ǫ = 10), ℓ 2 (ǫ = 2) and ℓ ∞ (ǫ = 0.3). For CIFAR10 we use ℓ ∞ (ǫ = We also use rotation-translation attacks with ±3px translations and ±30
• rotations as in [9] . We denote these models Adv 1 , Adv 2 , Adv ∞ , and Adv RT . We then use the "max" and "avg" strategies from Section 3 to train models Adv max and Adv avg against multiple perturbations. We train against all ℓ p -perturbations, and against both ℓ ∞ and RT perturbations. We use the same CNN model (for MNIST) and wide ResNet model (for CIFAR10) as Madry et al. [22] . Appendix A has more details on the training setup, and attack and training hyperparameters.
We thoroughly evaluate robustness of all models against multiple types of attacks: (1) we use gradient-based attacks for all ℓ p -norms, specifically PGD [19, 22] with 100 steps and 40 restarts (20 restarts on CIFAR10), as well as Carlini and Wagner's ℓ 2 -attack [6] , and an ℓ 1 -variant-EAD [7] ; (2) to detect gradient-masking, we use decision-based attacks, namely the Boundary Attack [3] for the ℓ 2 -norm, and the Pointwise Attack [28] for the ℓ 1 -norm; (3) for spatial attacks, we use the optimal brute-force attack of [9] that tries out all small rotations and translations.
For each model, we report accuracy on 1000 test points for: (1) each individual perturbation type; (2) the worst perturbation per input, 1 − R max adv ; and (3) the average of all perturbation types, 1 − R avg adv . We briefly discuss the optimal error that can be achieved if there is no robustness trade-off. For perturbation sets S 1 , . . . S n , let R 1 , . . . , R n be the optimal risks achieved by distinct models. Then, a single model can at best achieve risk R i for each S i , i.e., OPT(R
If the errors are fully correlated, so that a maximal number of inputs admit no attack, we have OPT(R max adv ) = max{R 1 , . . . , R n }. Our experiments show that these optimal error rates are not achieved.
Results on MNIST. Results are in Table 1 . The left table is for the union of ℓ p -attacks, and the right table is for the union of ℓ ∞ and RT attacks. In both cases, the multi-perturbation training strategies "succeed", in that models Adv avg and Adv max achieve higher multi-perturbation accuracy than any of the models trained against a single perturbation type.
The results for ℓ ∞ and RT attacks are promising, although the best model Adv max only achieves 1 − R max adv = 83.8% and 1 − R avg adv = 87.6%, which is far less than the optimal values, 1 − OPT(R max adv ) = min{91.4%, 94.6%} = 91.4% and 1 − OPT(R avg adv ) = (91.4% + 94.6%)/2 = 93%. Thus, these models do exhibit some form of the robustness trade-off analyzed in Section 2.
The ℓ p results are surprisingly mediocre and re-raise questions about whether MNIST can be considered "solved" from a robustness perspective. Indeed, while training separate models to resist ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 or ℓ ∞ attacks works well, resisting all attacks simultaneously fails. This agrees with the results of Schott et al. [28] , whose models achieve either high ℓ ∞ or ℓ 2 robustness, but not both simultaneously. We show that in our case, this lack of robustness is partly due to gradient masking.
First-order adversarial training and gradient masking on MNIST. The model Adv ∞ is not robust to ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 -attacks. This is unsurprising as the model was only trained on ℓ ∞ -attacks. Yet, comparing the model's accuracy against multiple types of ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 attacks (see Table 1 : Evaluation of MNIST models trained on ℓ ∞ , ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 attacks (left) or ℓ ∞ and rotation-translation (RT) attacks (right). Models Adv ∞ , Adv 1 and Adv RT are trained on a single attack, while Adv avg and Adv max are trained on multiple attacks using the "avg" and "max" strategies. The most robust models for each perturbation type are in bold (at 95% confidence). Results in red indicate gradient-masking, see Appendix C for a breakdown of all attacks. Appendix C) reveals a more curious phenomenon: Adv ∞ has high accuracy against first-order ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 -attacks such as PGD, but is broken by decision-free attacks. This is an indication of gradient-masking [24, 35, 1] . While this issue has been observed before [28, 20] , the reason underlying gradient masking was unclear (especially since first-order ℓ ∞ -attacks do appear optimal against model Adv ∞ [22]). We explain this phenomenon by inspecting the robust features learned by model Adv ∞ , as was done in [22] . We find that the model's first layer learns threshold filters z = ReLU(α · (x − ǫ)) for α > 0. As most pixels in MNIST are zero, most of the z i cannot be activated by any ǫ-bounded ℓ ∞ -attack. An ℓ ∞ -PGD attack thus optimizes a fairly smooth (albeit flat) loss function. In contrast, ℓ 1 -and ℓ 2 -attacks can move a pixel x i = 0 tox i > ǫ thus activating z i , but have no gradients to rely on (i.e, dz i /dx i = 0 for any x i ≤ ǫ). Figure 3 in Appendix D shows that the model's loss function resembles a step-function, for which first-order attacks such as PGD are inadequate.
Note that training against first-order ℓ 1 or ℓ 2 -attacks directly (i.e., models Adv 1 and Adv 2 in Table 1 ), seems to yield genuine robustness to these perturbations. This is surprising in that, because of gradient masking, model Adv ∞ actually achieves lower training loss against first-order ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 -attacks than models Adv 1 and Adv 2 . That is, Adv 1 and Adv 2 converged to sub-optimal local minima of their respective training objectives, yet these minima generalize much better to stronger attacks.
The models Adv avg and Adv max that are trained against ℓ ∞ , ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 -attacks also learn to use thresholding to resist ℓ ∞ -attacks while spuriously masking gradient for ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 -attacks. This is evidence that, unlike previously thought [36], training against a strong first-order attack (such as PGD) can cause the model to minimize its training loss via gradient masking. To circumvent this issue, alternatives to first-order adversarial training seem necessary. Potential (costly) approaches include training on gradient-free attacks, or extending certified defenses [25, 37] to multiple perturbations. Certified defenses provide provable bounds that are much weaker than the optimal empirical robustness, and simultaneously certifying multiple perturbation types is likely to exacerbate this gap.
Results on CIFAR10. The left table in Table 2 considers the union of ℓ ∞ and ℓ 1 perturbations, while the right table considers the union of ℓ ∞ and RT perturbations. As on MNIST, the models Adv avg and Adv max achieve better multi-perturbation robustness than any of the models trained on a single perturbation, but fail to match the optimal error rates we could hope for. For ℓ 1 and ℓ ∞ -attacks, we achieve 1 − R Interestingly, models Adv avg and Adv max achieve 100% training accuracy. Thus, multiperturbation robustness increases the adversarial generalization gap [27] . These models might be resorting to more memorization because they fail to find features robust to both attacks.
The (lack of) robustness of model Adv avg trained on ℓ ∞ and RT perturbations is surprising. Table 3 : Evaluation of affine attacks. For models trained with the "max" strategy, we evaluate against attacks from a union S U of perturbation sets, and against an affine adversary that interpolates between perturbations. Examples of affine attacks are in Figure 4 . Indeed, on CIFAR10, distinguishing the RT attack of [9] from ℓ ∞ -noise is trivial, due to the black in-painted pixels surrounding a rotated or translated image. The following ensemble model thus achieves optimal R avg adv (but not necessarily optimal R max adv ): on inputx, detect if the perturbation type is RT or ℓ ∞ . In the former case, return Adv RT (x), and in the latter return Adv ∞ (x). An interesting open question is to understand why adversarial training fails to learn this function.
Affine Adversaries. Finally, we evaluate the affine attacks introduced in Section 2.5. These attacks take affine combinations of two perturbation types, and we apply them on the models Adv max (we omit the ℓ p -case on MNIST due to gradient masking).
To compound ℓ ∞ and ℓ 1 -noise, we devise an attack that updates both perturbations in alternation. To compound ℓ ∞ and RT attacks, we pick random rotation-translations (with ±3βpx translations and ±30β
• rotations), apply an ℓ ∞ -attack with budget (1 − β)ǫ to each, and retain the worst example.
The results in Table 3 match the predictions of our formal analysis: (1) affine combinations of ℓ p -perturbations are no stronger than the union of the individual perturbations. This could be expected given Claim 3 and observations that neural networks are close to linear near the data [13, 26] ; (2) affine combinations of ℓ ∞ and RT attacks do yield a stronger attack, mirroring the result in Theorem 4. This shows that in some cases, attaining robustness to a union of perturbation types is itself insufficient, and more complex defensive strategies are needed to also protect against combinations of perturbations.
Discussion and Open Problems
Despite recent success in defending ML models against some perturbation types [22, 9, 28] , extending these defenses to multiple perturbations unveils a clear robustness trade-off. This tension may be rooted in its unconditional occurrence in natural and simple distributions, as we proved in Section 2.
While our new adversarial training strategies fail to achieve competitive robustness to more than one attack type, they do narrow the gap towards strong multi-perturbation robustness. Interestingly, our "max" strategy always outperforms the "avg" strategy, despite discarding most adversarial examples. It is also noteworthy that the optimal risks R max adv and R avg adv that we achieve are very close to each other. This means that for most data points, the models are either robust to all perturbation types or none of them. This could be further evidence that adversarial robustness is an appropriate metric for prototypical examples [4, 32] -as different attacks tend to agree upon the hard and easy examples.
Our work highlights, and leaves open, the challenge of circumventing gradient masking on MNIST to achieve simultaneous robustness to multiple ℓ p -attacks. As we argued, this may require other methods than first-order adversarial training. Another challenge is the computational cost of multi-perturbation defenses (our adversarial training strategies scale linearly in the number of perturbation types). Breaking this linear dependency requires efficient techniques for finding adversarial examples in a union of sets, which might be hard for sets with near-empty intersection (e.g., ℓ ∞ and ℓ 1 -balls).
The recent related works of Hendrycks and Dietterich [15] , and Geirhos et al. [11] measure robustness of classifiers to multiple common (i.e., not adversarially chosen) image perturbations and corruptions (e.g., random image blurring). In that setting, they also find that different classifiers achieve better robustness to some forms of common corruptions, but that no single classifier achieves the highest accuracy under all forms. The interplay between multi-perturbation robustness in the adversarial and common corruption case is worth further exploration.
[29] L. Schott 
A Experimental Setup
MNIST. We use the CNN model from Madry et al. [22] and train for 10 epochs with Adam and a learning rate of 10 −3 reduced to 10 −4 after 5 epochs (batch size of 100). To accelerate convergence, we train against a weaker adversary in the first epoch (with 1/3 of the perturbation budget). For training, we use PGD with 40 iterations for ℓ ∞ and 100 iterations for ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 . For rotation-translations, we use the attack from [9] that picks the worst of 10 random rotationtranslations.
CIFAR10. We use the same wide ResNet model as [22] . We train for 80k steps of gradient descent with batch size 128 (205 epochs). When using the "avg" strategy for wide ResNet models, we had to halve the batch size to avoid overflowing the GPU's memory. We accordingly doubled the number of training steps and learning rate schedule. We use a learning rate of 0.1 decayed by a factor 10 after 40k and 60k steps, a momentum of 0.9, and weight decay of 0.0002. Except for the RT attack, we use standard data augmentation with random padding, cropping and horizontal flipping (see [9] for details). We extract 1,000 points from the CIFAR10 test as a validation set for early-stopping.
For training, we use PGD with 10 iterations for ℓ ∞ , and 20 iterations for ℓ 1 .
3 For rotationtranslations, we also use the attack from [9] that trains on the worst of 10 randomly chosen rotation-translations. We run the attack for up to 1,000 steps and plot the evolution of the cross-entropy loss. We vary the sparsity of the gradient updates (controlled by the parameter q), and compare to the standard PGD attack that uses the steepest descent vector. For appropriate q, our attack vastly outperforms PGD. Table 4 : Breakdown of all attacks on MNIST models. For ℓ 1 , we use PGD, EAD [7] and the Pointwise Attack (PA) [28] . For ℓ 2 , we use PGD, C&W [6] and the Boundary Attack (BA) [3] . Table 5 : Breakdown of all attacks on CIFAR10 models. For ℓ 1 , we use PGD, EAD [7] and the Pointwise Attack (PA) [28] . P o i n t w i s e A t t a c k For a randomly chosen data point x, we compute an adversarial perturbation r PGD using PGD and r GF using a gradient-free attack. The left plot is for ℓ 1 -attacks with ǫ = 10 and the right plot is for ℓ 2 -attacks with ǫ = 2. The plots display the loss on points of the formx := x + α · r PGD + β · r GF , for α, β ∈ [0, ǫ]. The loss surface behaves like a step-function, and gradient-free attacks succeed in finding adversarial examples where first-order methods failed.
C Breakdown of Attacks on Adversarially Trained Models

D Gradient Masking as a Consequence of ℓ ∞ -Robustness on
MNIST.
Multiple works have reported on a curious phenomenon that affects the ℓ ∞ -adversarially trained model of Madry et al. [22] on MNIST. This model achieves strong robustness to the ℓ ∞ attacks it was trained on, as one would expect. Yet, on other ℓ p -norms (e.g., ℓ 1 [7, 28] and ℓ 2 [20, 28] ), its robustness is no better-or even worse-than for an undefended model. Some authors have referred to this effect as overfitting, a somewhat unfair assessment of the work of [22] , as their model actually achieves exactly what it was trained to do-namely resist ℓ ∞ -bounded attacks. Moreover, as our theoretical results suggest, this trade-off may be inevitable (a similar point was made in [18] ). The more intriguing aspect of Madry et al.'s MNIST model is that, when attacked by ℓ 1 or ℓ 2 adversaries, first-order attacks are sub-optimal. This was previously observed in [28] and in [20] , where decision-based or second-order attacks vastly outperformed gradient descent for finding ℓ 1 or ℓ 2 adversarial examples. Li et al. [20] argue that this effect is due to the gradients of the adversarially trained model having much smaller magnitude than in a standard model. Yet, this fails to explain why first-order attacks appear to be optimal in the ℓ ∞ -norm that the model was trained against.
A natural explanation for this discrepancy follows from an inspection of the robust model's first layer (as done in [22] ). All kernels of the model's first convolutional layer have very small norm, except for three kernels that have a single large weight. This reduces the convolution to a thresholding filter, which we find to be of one of two forms: either ReLU(α · (x − 0.3)) or ReLU(α · (x − 0.7)) for constant α > 0.
4 Thus, the model's first layer forms a piece-wise function with three distinct regimes, depending on the value of an input pixel x i : (1) for x i ∈ [0, 0.3], the output is only influenced by the low-weight kernels. For x i ∈ [0.3, 1], the ReLU(α · (x − 0.3)) filters become active, and override the signal from the low-weight kernels. For x i ∈ [0.7, 1], the ReLU(α · (x − 0.7)) filters are also active.
As most MNIST pixels are in {0, 1}, ℓ ∞ -attacks operate in a regime where most perturbed pixels are in [0, 0.3]∪[0. 7, 1] . The model's large-weight ReLUs thus never transition between active and inactive, which leads to a smooth, albeit flat loss that first-order methods navigate effectively.
For ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 attacks however, one would expect some of the ReLUs to be flipped as the attacks can make changes larger that 0.3 to some pixels. Yet, as most MNIST pixels are 0 (the digit's background), nearly all large-weight ReLUs start out inactive, with gradients equal to zero. A first-order adversary thus has no information on which pixels to focus the perturbation budget on.
Decision-based attacks sidestep this issue by disregarding gradients entirely. Figure 3 shows two examples of input points where a decision-based attack (Pointwise Attack for ℓ 1 [28] and Boundary Attack for ℓ 2 [3] ) finds an adversarial example in a direction that is orthogonal to the one explored by PGD. The loss surface exhibits sharp thresholding steps, as predicted by our analysis.
When we explicitly train against first-order ℓ 1 or ℓ 2 adversaries (models Adv 1 and Adv 2 in Table 1, left), the resulting model is robust (at least empirically) to ℓ 1 or ℓ 2 attacks. Note that model Adv ∞ actually achieves higher robustness to ℓ 2 -PGD attacks than Adv 2 (due to gradient-masking). Thus, the Adv 2 model converged to a sub-optimal local minima of its first-order adversarial training procedure (i.e., learning the same thresholding mechanism as Adv ∞ would yield lower loss). Yet, this sub-optimal local minima generalizes much better to other ℓ 2 attacks.
When we train against ℓ ∞ , ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 attacks simultaneously (i.e., models Adv all and Adv max ) in Table 1 , left), the models again learn to achieve robustness to ℓ ∞ attacks and thereby mask the gradients used for the ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 attacks.
E Examples of Affine Combinations of Perturbations
In Figure 4 , we display examples of ℓ 1 , ℓ ∞ and rotation-translation attacks on MNIST and CI-FAR10, as well as affine attacks that interpolate between two attack types. Our proof follows a similar structure to the proof of Theorem 2.1 in [36] , although the analysis is slightly simplified in our case as we are comparing two perturbation models, an ℓ ∞ -bounded one and an ℓ 1 -bounded one, that are essentially orthogonal to each other. With a perturbation of size ǫ = 2η, the ℓ ∞ -bounded noise can "flip" the distribution of the features x 1 , . . . , x d to reflect the opposite label, and thus destroy any information that a classifier might extract from those features. On the other side, an ℓ 1 -bounded perturbation with ǫ = 2 can flip the distribution of x 0 . By sacrificing some features, a classifier can thus achieve some robustness to either ℓ ∞ or ℓ 1 noise, but never to both simultaneously. For y ∈ {−1, +1}, let G y be the distribution over feature x 0 conditioned on the value of y. Similarly, let H y be the conditional distribution over features x 1 , . . . , x d . Consider the following perturbations: r ∞ = [0, −2yη, . . . , −2yη] has small ℓ ∞ -norm, and r 1 = [−2x 0 , 0, . . . , 0] has small ℓ 1 -norm. The ℓ ∞ perturbation can change H y to H −y , while the ℓ 1 perturbation can change G y to G −y . Let f (x) be any classifier from R d+1 to {−1, +1} and define:
The accuracy of f against the r ∞ perturbation is given by:
Similarly, the accuracy of f against the r 1 perturbation is:
Combining these, we get
As r ∞ and r 1 are two specific ℓ ∞ -and ℓ 1 -bounded perturbations, the above is an upper-bound on the accuracy that f achieves against worst-case perturbation within the prescribed noise models, which concludes the proof.
G Proof of Theorem 2 (Robustness trade-off between ℓ ∞ and spatial perturbations)
The proof of this theorem follows a similar blueprint to the proof of Theorem 1. Recall that an ℓ ∞ perturbation with ǫ = 2η can flip the distribution of the features x 1 , . . . , x n to reflect an opposite label y. The tricky part of the proof is to show that a small rotation or translation can flip the distribution of x 0 to the opposite label, without affecting the marginal distribution of the other features too much. Recall that we model rotations and translations as picking a permutation π from some fixed set Π of permutations over the indices in x, with the constraint that feature x 0 be moved to at most N different positions for all π ∈ Π.
We again define G y as the distribution of x 0 conditioned on y, and H y for the distribution of x 1 , . . . , x d . We know that a small ℓ ∞ -perturbation can transform H y into H −y . Our goal is to show that a rotation-translation adversary can change (G y , H y ) into a distribution that is very close to (G −y , H y ). The result of the theorem then follows by arguing that no binary classifier f can distinguish, with high accuracy, between ℓ ∞ -perturbed examples with label y and rotated examples with label −y (and vice versa).
We first describe our proof idea at a high level. We define an intermediate "hybrid" distribution Z y where all d + 1 features are i.i.d N (yη, 1) (that is, x 0 now has the same distribution as the other weakly-correlated features). The main step in the proof is to show that for samples from either (G y , H y ) or (G −y , H y ), a random rotation-translation yields a distribution that is very close (in total variation) to Z y . From this, we then show that there exists an adversary that applies two rotations or translations in a row, to first transform samples from (G y , H y ) into samples close to Z y , and then transform those samples into ones that are close to (G −y , H y ). We will need a standard version of the Berry-Esseen theorem, stated hereafter for completeness.
Theorem 5 (Berry-Esseen [2] ). Let X 1 , . . . , X n be independent random variables with E[
where the µ i , σ i and ρ i are constants independent of n. Let S n = X 1 + · · · + X n , with F n (x) the CDF of S n and Φ(x) the CDF of the standard normal distribution. Then,
For distributions P, Q, let ∆ TV (P, Q) denote their total-variation distance. The below lemma is the main technical result we need, and bounds the total variation between a multivariate Gaussian P and a special mixture of multivariate Gaussians Q.
Lemma 6. For k > 1, let P be a k-dimensional Gaussians with mean µ P = [λ P , . . . , λ P ] and identity covariance. For all i ∈ [k], let Q i be a multivariate Gaussian with mean µ i and diagonal
Define Q as a mixture distribution of the Q 1 , . . . , Q k with probabilities 1/k. Assuming that λ P , λ Q , σ Q are constants independent of k, we have
Proof. 5 Let p(x) and q(x) denote, respectively, the pdfs of P and Q. Note that q(x) =
, where q i (x) is the pdf of Q i . We first compute:
Thus we have that
The total-variation distance between P and Q is then ∆ TV (P, Q) = p 1 − p 2 , where
and the Z i ∼ N (λ P , 1), W n ∼ N (λ Q , σ 2 Q ) and all the Z i and W n are mutually independent. It is easy to verify that E[
. Then, applying the Berry-Esseen theorem, we get:
And thus,
We now define a rotation-translation adversary A with a budget of N . It samples a random permutation from the set Π of permutations that switch position 0 with a position in [0, N − 1] and leave all other positions fixed (note that |Π| = N ). Let A(G y , H y ) denote the distribution resulting from applying A to (G y , H y ) and define A(G −y , H y ) similarly. Recall that Z y is a hybrid distribution which has all features distributed as N (yη, 1).
Proof. For the first N features, samples output by A follow exactly the distribution Q from Lemma (6), for k = N and λ P = y · η, λ Q = y, σ
Note that in this case, the distribution P has each feature distributed as in Z y . Thus, Lemma (6) tells us that the distribution of the first N features is the same as in Z y , up to a total-variation distance of O(1/ √ N ). As features x N . . . , x d are unaffected by A and thus remain distributed as in Z y , we conclude that the totalvariation distance between A's outputs and
is similar, except that we apply Lemma (6) with λ Q = −y.
LetZ y be the true distribution A(G −y , H y ), which we have shown to be close to Z y . Consider the following "inverse" adversary A −1 . This adversary samples z ∼Z y and returns π −1 (z), for π ∈ Π, with probability
where f (G −y ,H y ) and fZ y are the probability density functions for (G −y , H y ) and forZ y .
Claim 8.
A −1 is a RT adversary with budget N that transformsZ y into (G −y , H y ).
Proof. Note that A −1 always applies the inverse of a perturbation in Π. So feature x 0 gets sent to at most N positions when perturbed by A −1 . Let Z be a random variable distributed asZ y and let h be the density function of the distribution obtained by applying A −1 to Z. We compute:
We can now finally define our main rotation-translation adversary, A * . The adversary first applies A to samples from (G y , H y ), and then applies A −1 to the resulting samples fromZ y .
Claim 9.
The adversary A * is a rotation-translation adversary with budget N . Moreover,
Proof. The adversary A * first switches x 0 with some random position in [0, N − 1] by applying A. Then, A −1 either switches x 0 back into its original position or leaves it untouched. Thus, A * always moves x 0 into one of N positions. The total-variation bound follows by the triangular inequality:
To conclude the proof, we define:
Then,
G.1 Numerical Estimates for the Robustness Trade-off in Theorem 2
While the robustness trade-off we proved in Theorem 2 is asymptotic in N (the budget of the RT adversary), we can provide tight numerical estimates for this trade-off for concrete parameter settings:
Remark 10. Let d ≥ 200, α = 2 and N = 49 (e.g., translations by ±3 pixels). Then, there exists a classifier with R adv (f ; S ∞ ) < 10%, as well as a (distinct) classifier with R adv (f ; S RT ) < 10%. Yet, any single classifier satisfies R avg adv (f ; S ∞ , S RT ) 0.425. We first show the existence of classifiers with R adv < 10% for the given ℓ ∞ and RT attacks. Let f (x) = sign(x 0 ) and let r = [−yǫ, 0, . . . , 0] be the worst-case perturbation with r ≤ ǫ.
Thus, f achieves R adv < 10% against the ℓ ∞ -perturbations. Let g(x) = sign( d i=N x i ) be a classifier that ignores all feature positions that a RT adversary A may affect. We have
Thus, g achieves R adv < 10% against RT perturbations.
We upper-bound the adversarial risk that any classifier must incur against both attacks by numerically estimating the total-variation distance between the distributions induced by the RT and ℓ ∞ adversaries for inputs of opposing labels y. Specifically, we generate 100,000 samples from the distributions G +1 , G −1 and H +1 as defined in the proof of Theorem 2, and obtain an estimate of the total-variation distance in Lemma (9) . For this, we numerically estimate p 1 and p 2 as defined in Equation (4) . Let S U := S p ∪ S q . Note that any r ∈ S affine is of the form βr 1 + (1 − β)r 2 for β ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, we have r 1 ∈ S p ⊂ S U and r 2 ∈ S q ⊂ S U . Thus, I Affine combinations of ℓ p -perturbations can affect nonlinear models
H Proof of
In Section 2.5, we showed that for linear models, robustness to a union of ℓ p -perturbations implies robustness to an affine adversary that interpolates between perturbation types. We show that this need not be the case when the model is non-linear. In particular, we can show that for the distribution D introduced in Section 2, non-linearity is necessary to achieve robustness to a union of ℓ ∞ and ℓ 1 -perturbations (with different parameter settings than for Theorem 1), but that at the same time, robustness to affine combinations of these perturbations is unattainable by any model.
Theorem 11.
Consider the distribution D with d ≥ 200, α = 2 and p 0 = 1 − Φ(−2). Let S ∞ be the set of ℓ ∞ -bounded perturbation with ǫ = (3/2)η = 3/ √ d and let S 1 be the set of ℓ 1 -bounded perturbations with ǫ = 3. Define S affine as in Section 2.5. Then, there exists a non-linear classifier g that achieves R max adv (g; S ∞ , S 1 ) ≤ 35%. Yet, for all classifiers f we have R adv (f ; S affine ) ≥ 50%. Proof. We first prove that no classifier can achieve accuracy above 50% (which is achieved by the constant classifier) against S affine . The proof is very similar to the one of Theorem 1.
J Proof of Theorem 4 (Affine combinations of ℓ ∞ -and spatial perturbations can affect linear models)
Note that our definition of affine perturbation allows for a different weighting parameter β to be chosen for each input. Thus, the adversary that selects perturbations from S affine is at least as powerful as the one that selects perturbations from S ∞ ∪S RT . All we need to show to complete the proof is that there exists some input x that the affine adversary can perturb, while the adversary limited to the union of spatial and ℓ ∞ perturbations cannot. Without loss of generality, assume that the RT adversary picks a permutation that switches x 0 with a position in [0, N − 1], and leaves all other indices untouched. The main idea is that for any input x where the RT adversary moves x 0 to position j < N − 1, the RT adversary with budget N is no more powerful than one with budget j + 1. The affine adversary can thus limit its rotation-translation budget and use the remaining budget on an extra ℓ ∞ perturbation.
We now construct an input x such that: (1) x cannot be successfully attacked by an RT adversary (with budget N ) or by an ℓ ∞ -adversary (with budget ǫ); (2) x can be attacked by an affine adversary.
Without loss of generality, assume that w 1 = min{w 1 , . . . , w N −1 }, i.e., among all the features that x 0 can be switched with, x 1 has the smallest weight. Let y = +1, and let x 1 , . . . , x N −1 be chosen such that arg min{x 1 , . . . , x N −1 } = 1. We set
Moreover, set x N , . . . , x d such that
Note that constructing such an x is always possible as we assumed w 0 > w i > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d. We now have an input (x, y) that has non-zero support under D. Let r be a perturbation with r ∞ ≤ ǫ. We have:
so f (w T (x + r) + b) = y, i.e., x cannot be attacked by any ǫ-bounded ℓ ∞ -perturbation. Definex i as the input x with features x 0 and x i switched, for some 0 ≤ i < N . Then,
Thus, the RT adversary cannot change the sign of f (x) either. This means that an adversary that chooses from S ∞ ∪ S RT cannot successfully perturb x. Now, consider the affine adversary, with β = 2/N that first applies an RT perturbation with budget Thus, f (x affine ) = −1 = y, so the affine adversary is strictly stronger that the adversary that is restricted to RT or ℓ ∞ perturbations.
